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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Sabina Hallam appeals from her judgment of conviction for grand theft by
unauthorized control and from the district court’s order awarding restitution.

She

asserts that the district court abused its discretion by retaining jurisdiction rather than
placing her on probation and that the restitution award is not support by substantial
evidence.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In June, 2012, Connie Braudau met with Owyhee County officials and reported
that Ms. Hallam had embezzled money from Anne Muller. (Presentence Investigation
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.3.) Ms. Brandau reported that Ms. Hallam was hired one
year prior to take care of Ms. Muller, who was in her 70’s, and Ms. Muller’s father, who
was 91. (PSI, p.3.) Ms. Brandau reported that Ms. Hallam had been using Ms. Muller’s
credit cards for her personal use. (PSI, p.3.) When asked about the instant offense,
Ms. Hallam stated, “I was handed a credit card and used it for personal items more than
I had prior permission for.” (PSI, p.5.)
In docket number 43035, Ms. Hallam pleaded guilty to grand theft by
unauthorized control and the district court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with
three years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction. (R., p.47.) Four other counts of
grand theft by unauthorized control were dismissed. (R., p.51.) Ms. Hallam appealed.
(R., p.58.)

Following the retained jurisdiction period, Ms. Hallam was placed on
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probation for a period of four years. (Order of Probation On Suspended Execution Of
Judgment After Retained Jurisdiction.)1
Following the order placing Ms. Hallam on probation, the court held a restitution
hearing. (See 8/28/15 Tr.) The court ordered $30,787 in restitution. (Supp. R., p.11.)
Ms. Hallam appealed from the Final Order of Restitution and this Court created a new
case, docket number 43737, and consolidated the cases.

(Supp. R., pp.11, 15;

12/23/15 Order.)

A motion to augment the record with this document is being filed contemporaneously
with this Appellant’s Brief.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it retained jurisdiction rather than
place Ms. Hallam on probation?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it awarded restitution?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Retained Jurisdiction Rather Than
Place Ms. Hallam On Probation
In docket number 43035, Ms. Hallam asserts that the district court abused its
discretion when it retained jurisdiction rather than place her probation.

Where a

defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence,
the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.’”

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Hallam does not allege that
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse
of discretion, Ms. Hallam must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120
Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385
(1992)). The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v.
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136
Idaho 138 (2001)).
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At the sentencing hearing, the State informed the court that it had reached the
following agreement: “The State has agreed and bound itself to a recommendation of a
three-year supervised probation term. We’ll ask the Court to follow that. Ask the Court
to impose a judgment of conviction three fixed following by two years. Discretionary jail
time.” (1/23/15 Tr., p.6, Ls.7-12.) Counsel for Ms. Hallam requested that the district
court following the State’s recommendation. (1/23/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.14-15.) The district
court imposed the underlying sentence that was agreed to by the parties, but the court
retained jurisdiction rather than place Ms. Hallam on a probation. (1/23/15 Tr., p.16,
Ls.21-24.)
Ms. Hallam acknowledges that she is now on probation. (See Order of Probation
On Suspended Execution Of Judgment After Retained Jurisdiction.)

Her period of

probation is four years, where the State requested three years at the sentencing
hearing. At the sentencing hearing, counsel for Mr. Hallam informed the court that,
while Ms. Hallam was disputing the restitution amount, “we pled guilty for a reason.
Ms. Hallam is admitting that she exceeded the scope of that agreement and she feels
terrible for it. And she admits that she owes [Ms. Muller] money, and that she made
unauthorized purchases during that trip to Oregon.” (1/23/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.6-11.) “But
as noted, what she told the presentence investigator, one, she feels terrible and, two,
she felt like she lost a friend from this whole thing in Ms. Muller.” (1/23/15 Tr., p.14,
Ls.12-14.) Considering that Ms. Hallam admitted that she exceeding the scope of the
agreement that she had with Ms. Muller, expressed remorse for her actions, and
admitted that she owed Ms. Muller money, Ms. Hallam respectfully submits that the
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district court abused its discretion by retained jurisdiction rather than placing Ms. Hallam
on probation for a period of three years.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Awarded Restitution
In docket number 43737, Ms. Muller asserts that the district court abused its
discretion by awarding restitution in the amount of $30,787. (Supp. R., p.11.) The
district court explained its reason in a Memorandum Decision and Order In Response to
Defendant’s Objection to Restitution.2
Connie Brandau, the former deputy treasurer of Owyhee County who had worked
in bookkeeping for most of her life, and who had been a friend of Ms. Muller since 1968
or 1969, was the first witness at the restitution hearing. (Tr., p.4, L.3 – p.5, L.22.) In
2012, Ms. Muller asked for her help because there was something wrong with her
finances and she did not have money to pay the bills. (Tr., p.6, Ls.1-3.)
Ms. Brandau testified that Ms. Muller’s father suffered from age-related dementia
and Ms. Muller suffered from peripheral neuropathy and was “pretty much housebound.”
(Tr., p.8, Ls.4-19.) She also had Parkinson’s disease and could no longer write checks.
(Tr., p.8, Ls.9-19.)
Ms. Braundau testified that Ms. Hallam “was buying Ann’s medicine. She was
taking them to their medical appointments. She was doing all of the shopping for them
for groceries, food, and delivering it to their house. She used Ann’s car to do that.”

A motion to augment the record with this document is being filed contemporaneously
with this Appellant’s Brief.
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(Tr., p.9, Ls.4-8.) This arrangement lasted approximately 17 months. (Tr., p.9, Ls.2023.)
Ms. Brandau was concerned that “you couldn’t track things very easily with
Ms. Hallam’s bookkeeping system.”

(Tr., p.10, Ls.12-15.)

She also believed that

Ms. Muller’s father should have had about $4,000 in his account and she discovered
that his accounts had been “zeroed out.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.16-22.) Ms. Brandau believed
that the expenditures were probably three to four times what it would have cost for two
people of that age to live. (Tr., p.11, Ls.3-5.)
Ms. Brandau testified that she reviewed bank statements for Ms. Muller’s credit
cards and discovered numerous expenditures for which Ms. Muller never received any
benefit. (Tr., p.12, Ls.8-10.) Ms. Brandau also testified that Ms. Hallam took a vacation
to Oregon and spent over $4,000 on Ms. Muller’s credit card. (Tr., p.13, Ls.2-21.)
When Ms. Brandau finally went to an attorney, she believed that there were
approximately $35,000 of unnecessary charges on Ms. Muller’s account. (Tr., p.16,
Ls.3-11.)
Gary Peer, a retired reserve deputy for the Owyhee County Sheriff’s Office
testified next. (Tr., p.28, Ls.1-3.) He was a CPA for about 17-18 years. (Tr., p.28,
Ls.12-15.) He took over most of the investigative work in the instant case in March of
2014. (Tr., p.30, Ls.7-9.) He testified that he reviewed documents provided to him by
Ms. Brandau and he, “identified what I believed were the majority of the charges on
those credit cards over about a 17-month period to have occurred at one of the three
Walmart stores in the Caldwell/Nampa area. We had very few receipts from those
stores, so I met with the asset management people in each of the Walmarts and got
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copies of the receipts for each of those charges that we did not have receipts for.”
(Tr., p.30, L.23 – p.31, L.5.)
Mr. Peer used a Bureau of Labor Statistics report3 to determine the “what might
be a reasonable amount of food for a family of two people.” (Tr., p.31, Ls.15-25.) He
then prepared a spreadsheet “that showed total expenditures by month during the 17month period and expenditures that I believed were inappropriate and Ms. Hallam
misused during that period.” (Tr., p.33, Ls.12-17.) This spreadsheet was introduced as
an exhibit. (State’s Exhibit 2.)4 Mr. Peer stated,
Well, as I went through the detailed receipts that we had, most of which
were Walmart – we had item by item expenditures on those receipts. So I
would look down through each of those, and where I would see something
that appeared to be what I would call significant or caught my attention, I
would not that, unless I had some reason to believe it was an
inappropriate charge. I would note that. And at some point I would go
through that list with Ms. Muller and ask her, you know, did you buy – was
this purchased for you? And so over that process I determined the
charges that I believed were not for her.
(Tr., p.33, L.24 – p.34, L.11.) Mr. Peer acknowledged that Ms. Muller was suffering
from memory loss at the time he did the investigation. (Tr., p.53, Ls.1-3.)
In the spreadsheet, Mr. Peer calculated $49,194.23 total charges on Ms. Muller’s
credit card, and that $21,701.49 were unauthorized.

(State’s Exhibit 2.)

Of this

$21,701.49, Mr. Peer stated that “some of the expenditures were assumed by me,” and
that he did not ask Ms. Muller about all of the expenditures, “I asked specifically about
the items that I noted as being suspect.” (Tr., p.47, L.17 – p.48, L.12.) The suspect

A motion to augment the record with this document is being filed contemporaneously
with this Appellant’s Brief
4 A motion to augment the record with this document is being filed contemporaneously
with this Appellant’s Brief.
3
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items were things that appeared not to be for Ms. Muller. (Tr., p.47, L.1-16.) Based on
the Bureau of Labor Statistics Report, as well as his, “own estimate just because of how
I live with my wife, the two of us,” Mr. Peer estimated between $12,386 and $16,466 for
“food and sundries” were attributable to Ms. Hallam. (Tr., p.39, Ls.14-17; State’s Exhibit
3.)5 Mr. Peer then acknowledged that he had originally made a miscalculation and did
not take into account that Ms. Hallam was authorized to drive Ms. Muller’s vehicle and
therefore credited approximately $3,000-$3,500 for the price of gasoline. (Tr., p.40,
L.13 – p.41, L.8.) Mr. Peer’s revised restitution figure was therefore between $30,000
and $35,000. (Tr., p.41, L.13-16.)
Counsel for Ms. Hallam called Kaylene Cameron as a witness. (Tr., p.62, Ls.915.) She testified that she worked for Ms. Muller “just cleaning her house and doing
laundry” from April of 2011 to July of 2012. (Tr., p.62, L.20 – p.63, L.5.) She believed
that Ms. Muller kept “excessive amounts” of some groceries, such as Ensure, meat,
fruit, and vegetables. (Tr., p.64, Ls.19-22.) She would keep beer and soda in the fridge
for one of her friends. (Tr., p.65, Ls.1-7.) Ms. Cameron testified that Ms. Muller would
buy gifts such as DVD’s for her grandchildren. (Tr., p.66, Ls.2-21.) She also testified
that Ms. Hallam would give Mr. Muller cash to reimburse her for small purchases, such
as cigarettes. (Tr., p.67, Ls.1-10.) Further, she testified that Ms. Hallam occasionally
bought clothing for Ms. Muller and her father. (Tr., p.67, L.21 – p.68, L.2.)
The district court based the restitution amount solely on the testimony of Mr. Peer
and awarded the lower end of his estimation. See Memorandum Decision and Order In

A motion to augment the record with this document is being filed contemporaneously
with this Appellant’s Brief.
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Response to Defendant’s Objection to Restitution. Ms. Hallam asserts that the district
court’s decision is not based on substantial, competent evidence.
Idaho Code § 19-5304(6) provides:
Restitution orders shall be entered by the court at the time of sentencing
or such later date as deemed necessary by the court. Economic loss shall
be based upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the court by
the prosecutor, defendant, victim or presentence investigator. Each party
shall have the right to present such evidence as may be relevant to the
issue of restitution, and the court may consider such hearsay as may be
contained in the presentence report, victim impact statement or otherwise
provided to the court.
I.C. § 19-5304(6).
The burden is on the State to show a causal relationship between the
defendant’s criminal conduct and the damages for which restitution is claimed. State v.
Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011). State v. McNeil, 158 Idaho 280, 283 (Ct. App.
2014). The restitution statute defines “victim” as someone who suffers economic loss or
injury “as the result of the defendant’s criminal conduct.” I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i & iv). In
determining whether the requisite causal nexus exists, a court applies torts principles,
including standards of actual and proximate cause. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602. Actual
cause is whether “a particular event produced a particular consequence” and is a “but
for” test. State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374 (2009). Proximate cause focuses on
the foreseeability of the injury, thus the court must determine whether the injury was “so
highly unusual that we can say, as a matter of law that a reasonable [person], making
an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not
have reasonably expected the injury to occur.” Id. (quoting Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho
868, 875 (2009)). Such causation must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
I.C. § 19-5304(6); McNeil, 158 Idaho at 284. When considering the general restitution
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statute, the Idaho Court of Appeals has explained that “the amount of the award must
be supported by substantial evidence” and is to be determined “based upon the civil
preponderance of the evidence standard.” In re Doe, 146 Idaho 277, 284 (Ct. App.
2008) (citations omitted).
As noted above, Mr. Peer identified $21,701 in identifiable goods. Ms. Hallam
submits that this figure is not supported by substantial evidence in the record.

In

calculating this amount, Mr. Peer stated, “So I would look down through each of those
[receipts], and where I would see something that appeared to be what I would call
significant or caught my attention, I would note that, unless I had some reason to
believe it was an inappropriate charge.” (Tr., p.33, L.24 – p.34, L.11.) He would review
some charges with Ms. Muller but not others that he deemed unauthorized. (Tr., p.33,
L.24 – p.34, L.11.)
In this case, the State did not submit any receipts for unauthorized purchases
and did not provide evidence of the specific amount for any purchases. Mr. Peer’s
spreadsheet simply lists amounts he believed were attributable to Ms. Hallam over
certain periods of time. (State’s Exhibit 2.) There is no individual accounting of the
“identifiable” purchases in the record. While Mr. Peer identified certain items, such as
DVD players, that he did not believe would be attributable to Ms. Muller, there is no
evidence of their value or when they were purchased. Where the evidence supporting
the $21,701 award is simply a review of what Mr. Peer believed to be unauthorized
purchases, some of which were confirmed by Mr. Muller (but it is unclear which ones),
the evidence is not substantial.

Because the State did not sufficient prove that
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Ms. Hallam made unauthorized purchases in this amount, this portion of the restitution
award must be vacated.
Ms. Hallam also submits that the award for “food and sundries” is not supported
by substantial, competent evidence. Based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics report,
Mr. Peer determined that the annual average expenditure for a family of 2 was
approximately $260 per month. (State’s Exhibit 3.) The Bureau of Labor Statistics also
listed expenditures for “food away from home;” despite the fact that Mr. Peer concluded
that Muller household “took all their meals at home,” he added an additional $70 to the
monthly amount. (State’s Exhibit 3.) Then, while acknowledging that the Bureau of
Labor Statistics did not provide an estimate for sundries, he added $100 per month,
which was his, “own estimate just because of how I live with my wife, the two of us.” He
then added $50 a month “to pick up any minor items.” (Tr., p.39, Ls.14-17; State’s
Exhibit 3.)

Based on these “calculations,” Mr. Peer determined that range of

expenditures was between $12,386 to $16,466 (he allowed himself a “fudge factor” of
150 percent.). (Tr., p.39, Ls.22-23; State’s Exhibit 3.) Based on Mr. Peer’s admitted
miscalculation regarding fuel for Ms. Muller’s vehicle, the district court subtracted
$3,300 from these amounts.

(Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant’s

Objection To Restitution.) The court awarded the low end of Mr. Peer’s estimate, for an
amount of $9,086. (Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant’s Objection To
Restitution.)
The only item supported by “evidence” in this portion of the award is the average
food expenditure of $260 a month. While the Court of Appeals has held that statistical
models can constitute competent evidence, State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819 (Ct. App.
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2010), the Idaho Supreme Court has subsequently held that damages that are
speculative cannot be awarded.

See State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 890 (2013)

(holding that evidence regarding lost future wages is a speculative, rather than an actual
economic loss). The Straub Court made it clear that restitution may only be awarded for
loss “actually suffered.” Id. Because it is unknown whether Ms. Muller actually suffered
in the amount determined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, this portion of the award is
speculative.
However, even if this Court determines that the use of a statistical model is
appropriate, the remainder of Mr. Peer’s findings are not supported by anything other
than speculation. Despite finding that the Muller’s did not go out to dinner, Mr. Peer
determined that $70 a month for “food away from home” was appropriate.

His

determination of $100 a month for “sundries” was based solely on what he believed he
and his wife might spend. Finally, he added $50 a month for “minor items” which is
based on no evidence at all. Because the State failed to present substantial, competent
evidence in support of the restitution award, Ms. Hallam submits that the restitution
award must be vacated.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Hallam requests that her case be remanded for the district court to place her
on probation for a period of three years and that the district court’s final order of
restitution be vacated.
DATED this 30th day of March, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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